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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 80-5727
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1982.SCT.40388 <http://www.versuslaw.com>; 455 U.S. 104, 102
S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 50 U.S.L.W. 4161
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decided: January 19, 1982.
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EDDINGS
v.
OKLAHOMA
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CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA.
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Jay C. Baker, by appointment of the Court, 451 U.S. 981, argued the cause and filed a brief for
petitioner.
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David W. Lee, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, argued the cause
for respondent. With him on the brief were Jan Eric Cartwright, Attorney
General, and Tomilou Gentry Liddell, Assistant Attorney General.*fn*
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Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, and O'connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., post, p. 117,
and O'connor, J., post, p. 117, filed concurring opinions. Burger, C. J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 120.
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Author: Powell
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
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Petitioner Monty Lee Eddings was convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Because this sentence was
imposed without "the type of individualized consideration of mitigating
factors . . . required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital
cases," Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978)
(opinion of BURGER, C. J.), we reverse.
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I
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On April 4, 1977, Eddings, a 16-year-old youth, and
several younger companions ran away from their Missouri homes. They
traveled in a car owned by Eddings' brother, and drove without
destination or purpose in a southwesterly direction eventually reaching
the Oklahoma Turnpike. Eddings had in the car a shotgun
and several rifles he had taken from his father. After he momentarily lost
control of the car, he was signaled to pull over by Officer Crabtree of
the Oklahoma Highway Patrol. Eddings did so, and when the
officer approached the car, Eddings stuck a loaded shotgun
out of the window and fired, killing the officer.
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Because Eddings was a juvenile, the State
moved to have him certified to stand trial as an adult. Finding that there
was prosecutive merit to the complaint and that Eddings was not amenable to
rehabilitation within the juvenile system, the trial court granted the
motion. The ruling was affirmed on appeal. In re M. E., 584 P. 2d 1340
(Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied sub nom. Eddings v. Oklahoma,
436 U.S. 921 (1978). Eddings was then charged with
murder in the first degree, and the District Court of Creek County found
him guilty upon his plea of nolo contendere.
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The Oklahoma death penalty statute provides in pertinent
part:
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"Upon conviction . . . of guilt of a defendant of murder in the first
degree, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment. . . . In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be
presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §
701.10 (1980) (emphasis added).
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Section 701.12 lists seven separate aggravating circumstances; the
statute nowhere defines what is meant by "any mitigating
circumstances."
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At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged three of the aggravating
circumstances enumerated in the statute: that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that the crime was committed for the purpose
of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest, and that there was a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society. §§ 701.12(4), (5), and (7).
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In mitigation, Eddings presented substantial
evidence at the hearing of his troubled youth. The testimony of his
supervising Juvenile Officer indicated that ddings had been raised without
proper guidance. His parents were divorced when he was 5 years old, and
until he was 14 Eddings lived with his mother
without rules or supervision. App. 109. There is the suggestion that Eddings'
mother was an alcoholic and possibly a prostitute. Id., at 110-111. By the
time Eddings was 14 he no longer could
be controlled, and his mother sent him to live with his father. But
neither could the father control the boy. Attempts to reason and talk gave
way to physical punishment. The Juvenile Officer testified that Eddings was
frightened and bitter, that his father overreacted and used excessive
physical punishment: "Mr. Eddings found the only thing that
he thought was effectful with the boy was actual punishment, or physical
violence -- hitting with a strap or something like this."*fn1 Id., at 121.
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Testimony from other witnesses indicated that Eddings was emotionally disturbed
in general and at the time of the crime, and that his mental and emotional
development were at a level several years below his age. Id., at 134, 149,
and 173. A state psychologist stated that Eddings had a sociopathic or
antisocial personality and that approximately 30% of youths suffering from
such a disorder grew out of it as they aged. Id., at 137 and 139. A
sociologist specializing in juvenile offenders testified that Eddings was
treatable. Id., at 149. A psychiatrist testified that Eddings
could be rehabilitated by intensive therapy over a 15- to 20-year period. crime
was committed. Should I fail to do this, I think I would not be carrying
out my duty." Id., at 188-189. But he would not consider in mitigation the
circumstances of Eddings' unhappy upbringing and
emotional disturbance: "[The] Court cannot be persuaded entirely by the .
. . fact that the youth was sixteen years old when this heinous crime was
committed. Nor can the Court in following the law, in my opinion, consider
the fact of this young man's violent background." Id., at 189 (emphasis
added). Finding that the only mitigating circumstance was Eddings'
youth and finding further that this circumstance could not outweigh the
aggravating circumstances present, the judge sentenced Eddings to
death.
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The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence of death. 616 P.
2d 1159 (1980). It found that each of the aggravating circumstances
alleged by the State had been present.*fn4 It recited the mitigating evidence
presented by Eddings in some detail, but in
the end it agreed with the trial court that only the fact of Eddings'
youth was properly considered as a mitigating circumstance:
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"[Eddings] also argues his mental
state at the time of the murder. He stresses his family history in saying
he was suffering from severe psychological and emotional disorders, and
that the killing was in actuality an inevitable product of the way he was
raised. There is no doubt that the petitioner has a personality disorder.
But all the evidence tends to show that he knew the difference between
right and wrong at the time he pulled the trigger, and that is the test of
criminal responsibility in
this State. For the same reason, the petitioner's family history is useful
in explaining why he behaved the way he did, but it does not excuse his
behavior." Id., at 1170 (citation omitted).
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II
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In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), CHIEF
JUSTICE BURGER, writing for the plurality, stated the rule that we apply
today:*fn5
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"[We] conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death." Id., at 604 (emphasis in
original).
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Recognizing "that the imposition of death by public authority is . . .
profoundly different from all other penalties," the plurality held that
the sentencer must be free to give "independent mitigating weight to
aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of
the offense proffered in mitigation . . . ." Id., at 605. Because the Ohio
death penalty statute only permitted consideration of three mitigating
circumstances, the Court found the statute to be invalid.
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As THE CHIEF JUSTICE explained, the rule in Lockett is the product of
a considerable history reflecting the law's effort to develop a system of
capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and
sensible to the uniqueness of the individual. Since the early days of the
common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate these twin
objectives. Thus, the common law began by treating all criminal homicides
as capital offenses, with a mandatory
sentence of death. Later it allowed exceptions, first through an exclusion
for those entitled to claim benefit of clergy and then by limiting capital
punishment to murders upon "malice prepensed." In this country we
attempted to soften the rigor of the system of mandatory death sentences
we inherited from England, first by grading murder into different degrees
of which only murder of the first degree was a capital offense and then by
committing use of the death penalty to the absolute discretion of the
jury. By the time of our decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), the country had moved so far from a mandatory
system that the imposition of capital punishment frequently had become
arbitrary and capricious.
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Beginning with Furman, the Court has attempted to provide standards
for a constitutional death penalty that would serve both goals of
measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused. Thus, in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the principal
opinion held that the danger of an arbitrary and capricious death penalty
could be met "by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the
sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance." Id., at
195. By its requirement that the jury find one of the aggravating
circumstances listed in the death penalty statute, and by its direction to
the jury to consider "any mitigating circumstances," the Georgia statute
properly confined and directed the jury's attention to the circumstances
of the particular crime and to "the characteristics of the person who
committed the crime . . . ." Id., at 197.*fn6
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Similarly, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), the plurality held that mandatory death sentencing
was not a permissible response to the problem of arbitrary jury
discretion. As the history of capital punishment had shown, such an
approach to the problem of discretion could not succeed while the Eighth
Amendment required that the individual be given his due: "the fundamental
respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and
the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."
Id., at 304.*fn7 See Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977); Roberts (Stanislaus) v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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Thus, the rule in Lockett followed from the earlier decisions of the
Court and from the Court's insistence that capital punishment be imposed
fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all. By requiring that
the sentencer be permitted to focus "on the characteristics of the person
who committed the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 197, the rule in
Lockett recognizes that "justice . . . requires . . . that there be taken
into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character
and propensities of the offender." Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). By holding that the sentencer in capital
cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, the
rule in Lockett recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring
individual differences is a false consistency.
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III
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We now apply the rule in Lockett to the circumstances of this case.
The trial judge stated that "in following the law," he
could not "consider the fact of this young man's violent background." App.
189. There is no dispute that by "violent background" the trial judge was
referring to the mitigating evidence of Eddings' family history.*fn8 From this statement it is clear that the
trial judge did not evaluate the evidence in mitigation and find it
wanting as a matter of fact; rather he found that as a matter of law he
was unable even to consider the evidence.
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The Court of Criminal Appeals took the same approach. It found that
the evidence in mitigation was not relevant because it did not tend to
provide a legal excuse from criminal responsibility. Thus the court
conceded that Eddings had a "personality
disorder," but cast this evidence aside on the basis that "he knew the
difference between right and wrong . . . and that is the test of criminal
responsibility." 616 P. 2d, at 1170. Similarly, the evidence of Eddings'
family history was "useful in explaining" his behavior, but it did not
"excuse" the behavior. From these statements it appears that the Court of
Criminal Appeals also considered only that evidence to be mitigating which
would tend to support a legal excuse from criminal
liability.
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We find that the limitations placed by these courts upon the
mitigating evidence they would consider violated the rule in Lockett.*fn9 Just as the State may not by statute
preclude the
sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the
sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating
evidence. In this instance, it was as if the trial judge had instructed a
jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf.
The sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may determine
the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give
it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration.*fn10
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Nor do we doubt that the evidence Eddings offered was relevant
mitigating evidence. Eddings was a youth of 16 years
at the time of the murder. Evidence of a difficult family history and of
emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation.
See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 187-188,
193 (1971). In some cases, such evidence properly may be given little
weight. But when the defendant was 16 years old at the time of the offense
there can be no doubt that evidence of a turbulent family history, of
beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance is
particularly relevant.
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The trial judge recognized that youth must be considered a relevant
mitigating factor. But youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a
time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence and to psychological damage.*fn11 Our history is replete with laws and
judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years,
generally are
less mature and responsible than adults.*fn12 Particularly "during the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment" expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
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Even the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks the maturity of an
adult. In this case, Eddings was not a normal
16-year-old; he had been deprived of the care, concern, and paternal
attention that children deserve. On the contrary, it is not disputed that
he was a juvenile with serious emotional problems, and had been raised in
a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background. In addition,
there was testimony that Eddings' mental and emotional
development were at a level several years below his chronological age. All
of this does not suggest an absence of responsibility for the crime of
murder, deliberately committed in this case. Rather, it is to say that
just as the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating
factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emotional
development of a youthful defendant be duly considered in
sentencing.
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We are not unaware of the extent to which minors engage increasingly
in violent crime.*fn13 Nor do we suggest an absence of legal
responsibility where a crime is committed by a minor. We are concerned
here only with the manner of the imposition of the ultimate penalty: the
death sentence imposed for the crime of murder upon an emotionally
disturbed youth with a disturbed child's immaturity. On
remand, the state courts must consider all relevant mitigating evidence
and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances. We do
not weigh the evidence for them. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed to
the extent that it sustains the imposition of the death penalty, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
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So ordered.
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Disposition
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616 P. 2d 1159, reversed in part and remanded.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.
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I join the Court's opinion without, however, departing from my view
that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (dissenting
opinion).
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.
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I write separately to address more fully the reasons why this case
must be remanded in light of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), which requires the trial court to consider and
weigh all of the mitigating evidence concerning the petitioner's family
background and personal history.*fn*
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Because sentences of death are "qualitatively different" from prison
sentences, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ.), this Court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the
prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee,
as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of
whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake. Surely, no less can be required when
the defendant is a minor. One example of the measures taken is in Lockett
v. Ohio, supra, where a plurality of this Court wrote:
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"There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases
governmental authority should be used to impose death. But a statute that
prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent
mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and
to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk
that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call
for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that
risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id., at 605 (opinion of BURGER, C.
J.).
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In order to ensure that the death penalty was not erroneously imposed,
the Lockett plurality concluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case,
not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." Id., at 604 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
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In the present case, of course, the relevant Oklahoma statute permits
the defendant to present evidence of any mitigating circumstance. See
Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980). Nonetheless, in sentencing the
petitioner (which occurred about one month before Lockett was decided),
the judge remarked that he could not "in following the law . . . consider the
fact of this young man's violent background." App. 189. Although one can
reasonably argue that these extemporaneous remarks are of no legal
significance, I believe that the reasoning of the plurality opinion in
Lockett compels a remand so that we do not "risk that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty." 438 U.S., at 605.
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I disagree with the suggestion in the dissent that remanding this case
may serve no useful purpose. Even though the petitioner had an opportunity
to present evidence in mitigation of the crime, it appears that the trial
judge believed that he could not consider some of the mitigating evidence
in imposing sentence. In any event, we may not speculate as to whether the
trial judge and the Court of Criminal Appeals actually considered all of
the mitigating factors and found them insufficient to offset the
aggravating circumstances, or whether the difference between this Court's
opinion and the trial court's treatment of the petitioner's evidence is
"purely a matter of semantics," as suggested by the dissent. Woodson and
Lockett require us to remove any legitimate basis for finding ambiguity
concerning the factors actually considered by the trial
court.
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE may be correct in concluding that the Court's
opinion reflects a decision by some Justices that they would not have
imposed the death penalty in this case had they sat as the trial judge.
See post, at 127. I, however, do not read the Court's opinion either as
altering this Court's opinions establishing the constitutionality of the
death penalty or as deciding the issue of whether the Constitution permits
imposition of the death penalty on an individual who committed a murder at
age 16. Rather, by listing in detail some of the circumstances surrounding
the petitioner's life, the Court has sought to emphasize the variety of
mitigating information that may not have been considered by the trial
court in deciding whether to impose the death penalty or some lesser
sentence. CHIEF
JUSTICE BURGER, with whom JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE
REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
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It is important at the outset to remember -- as the Court does not --
the narrow question on which we granted certiorari. We took care to limit
our consideration to whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the imposition of a death sentence on an offender because he was 16 years
old in 1977 at the time he committed the offense; review of all other
questions raised in the petition for certiorari was denied. 450
U.S. 1040 (1981). Yet the Court today goes beyond the issue on
which review was sought -- and granted -- to decide the case on a point
raised for the first time in petitioner's brief to this Court. This claim
was neither presented to the Oklahoma courts nor presented to this Court
in the petition for certiorari.*fn1 Relying on this "11th-hour" claim, the
Court strains to construct a plausible legal theory to support its mandate
for the relief granted.
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I
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In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), we
considered whether Ohio violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by
sentencing Lockett to death under a statute that "narrowly [limited] the
sentencer's discretion to consider the circumstances
of the crime and the record and character of the offender as mitigating
factors." Id., at 589. The statute at issue, Ohio Rev. Code §§
2929.03-2929.04(B) (1975), required the trial court to impose the death
penalty upon Lockett's conviction for "aggravated murder with
specifications,"*fn2 unless it found "that (1) the victim had
induced or facilitated the offense, (2) it was unlikely that Lockett would
have committed the offense but for the fact that she 'was under duress,
coercion, or strong provocation,' or (3) the offense was 'primarily the
product of [Lockett's] psychosis or mental deficiency.'" 438
U.S., at 593-594. It was plain that although guilty of felony
homicide under Ohio law, Lockett had played a relatively minor role in a
robbery which resulted in a homicide actually perpetrated by the hand of
another. Lockett had previously committed no major offenses; in addition,
a psychological report described her "prognosis for rehabilitation" as
"favorable." Id., at 594. However, since she was not found to have acted
under duress, did nto suffer from "psychosis," and was not "mentally
deficient," the sentencing judge concluded that he had "'no alternative,
whether [he] [liked] the law or not' but to impose the death penalty."
Ibid.
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We held in Lockett that the "Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death." Id., at 604 (emphasis in original). We
therefore found the Ohio statute flawed, because it
did not permit individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances --
such as the defendant's comparatively minor role in the offense, lack of
intent to kill the victim, or age. Id., at 606-608. We did not, however,
undertake to dictate the weight that a sentencing court must ascribe to
the various factors that might be categorized as "mitigating," nor did we
in any way suggest that this Court may substitute its sentencing judgment
for that of state courts in capital cases.
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In contrast to the Ohio statute at issue in Lockett, the Oklahoma
death penalty statute provides:
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"In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any
mitigating circumstances or as to any of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in this act." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980) (emphasis
added).
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The statute further provides that
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"[unless] at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances
enumerated in this act is [found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt] or if
it is found that any such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by the
finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty shall
not be imposed." § 701.11.
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This provision, of course, instructs the sentencer to weigh the
mitigating evidence introduced by a defendant against the aggravating
circumstances proved by the State.*fn3
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The Oklahoma statute thus contains provisions virtually identical to
those cited with approval in Lockett, as examples of proper legislation
which highlighted the Ohio statute's "constitutional infirmities." 438 U.S., at 606-607. Indeed, the Court does not
contend that the Oklahoma sentencing provisions
are inconsistent with Lockett. Moreover, the Court recognizes that, as
mandated by the Oklahoma statute, Eddings was permitted to present
"substantial evidence at the [sentencing] hearing of his troubled youth."
Ante, at 107.*fn4
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In its attempt to make out a violation of Lockett, the Court relies
entirely on a single sentence of the trial court's opinion delivered from
the bench at the close of the sentencing hearing. After discussing the
aggravated nature of petitioner's offense, and noting that he had "given
very serious consideration to the youth of the Defendant when this
particular crime was committed," the trial judge said that he could not "be
persuaded entirely by the . . . fact that the youth was sixteen years old
when this heinous crime was committed. Nor can the Court in following the
law, in my opinion, consider the fact of this young man's violent
background." App. 189.
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From this statement, the Court concludes "it is clear that the trial
judge did not evaluate the evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a
matter of fact, rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even
to consider the evidence." Ante, at 113. This is simply not a correct
characterization of the sentencing judge's action.
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In its parsing of the trial court's oral statement, the Court ignores
the fact that the judge was delivering his opinion extemporaneously from
the bench, and could not be expected to frame each utterance with the
specificity and precision that might be expected of a written opinion or
statute. Extemporaneous courtroom statements are not often models of
clarity. Nor does the Court give any weight to the fact that the trial
court had spent considerable time listening to the testimony of a
probation officer and various mental health professionals who described Eddings'
personality and family history -- an obviously meaningless exercise if, as
the Court asserts, the judge believed he was barred "as a matter of law"
from "considering" their testimony. Yet even examined in isolation, the
trial court's statement is at best ambiguous;*fn5 it can just as easily be read to say that,
while the court had
taken account of Eddings' unfortunate childhood,
it did not consider that either his youth or his family background was
sufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances that the evidence
revealed. Certainly nothing in Lockett would preclude the court from
making such a determination.
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The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals independently examined the
evidence of "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors presented at Eddings'
sentencing hearing. 616 P. 2d 1159 (1980). After reviewing the testimony
concerning Eddings' personality and family
background, and after referring to the trial court's discussion of
mitigating circumstances, it stated that while Eddings' "family history is
useful in explaining why he behaved the way he did, . . . it does not
excuse his behavior." Id., at 1170 (emphasis added). From this the Court
concludes that "the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered only that
evidence to be mitigating which would tend to support a legal excuse from
criminal liability." Ante, at 113.*fn6 However, there is no reason to read that
court's statements as reflecting anything more than a conclusion that Eddings'
background was not a sufficiently mitigating factor to tip the scales,
given the aggravating circumstances, including Eddings' statements immediately
before the killing.*fn7 The Court of Criminal Appeals most
assuredly did not, as the Court's opinion suggests, hold that this
"evidence in mitigation was not relevant," see ibid.; indeed, had the
Court of Criminal Appeals thought the evidence irrelevant, it
is unlikely that it would have spent several paragraphs summarizing it.
The Court's opinion offers no reasonable explanation for its assumption
that the Court of Criminal Appeals considered itself bound by some
unstated legal principle not to "consider" Eddings'
background.
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To be sure, neither the Court of Criminal Appeals nor the trial court
labeled Eddings' family background and
personality disturbance as "mitigating factors." It is plain to me,
however, that this was purely a matter of semantics associated with the
rational belief that "evidence in mitigation" must rise to a certain level
of persuasiveness before it can be said to constitute a "mitigating
circumstance." In contrast, the Court seems to require that any
potentially mitigating evidence be described as a "mitigating factor" --
regardless of its weight; the insubstantiality of the evidence is simply
to be a factor in the process of weighing the evidence against aggravating
circumstances. Yet if this is all the Court's opinion stands for, it
provides scant support for the result reached. For it is clearly the
choice of the Oklahoma courts -- a choice not inconsistent with Lockett or
any other decision of this Court -- to accord relatively little weight to
Eddings'
family background and emotional problems as balanced against the
circumstances of his crime and his potential for future dangerousness.*fn8 II
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| [68] |
It can never be less than the most painful of our duties to pass on
capital cases, and the more so in a case such as this one. However, there
comes a time in every case when a court must "bite the
bullet."
|
| [69] |
Whether the Court's remand will serve any useful purpose remains to be
seen, for petitioner has already been given an opportunity to introduce
whatever evidence he considered relevant to the sentencing determination.
Two Oklahoma courts have weighed that evidence and found it insufficient
to offset the aggravating circumstances shown by the State. The Court's
opinion makes clear that some Justices who join it would not have imposed
the death penalty had they sat as the sentencing authority, see, e. g.,
ante, at 115-116. Indeed, I
am not sure I would have done so. But the Constitution does not authorize
us to determine whether sentences imposed by state courts are sentences we
consider "appropriate"; our only authority is to decide whether they are
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The Court stops far short of
suggesting that there is any constitutional proscription against
imposition of the death penalty on a person who was under age 18 when the
murder was committed. In the last analysis, the Court is forced to
conclude that it is "the state courts [which] must consider [petitioner's
mitigating evidence] and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating
circumstances. We do not weigh the evidence for them." Ante, at
117.
|
| [70] |
Because the sentencing proceedings in this case were in no sense
inconsistent with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978), I would decide the sole issue on which we granted certiorari, and
affirm the judgment.
|
| [71] |
Counsel FOOTNOTES
|
| [72] |
* Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by M. Gail
Robinson, Kevin Michael McNally, and J. Vincent Aprile II for Kentucky
Youth Advocates et al.; and by Robert L. Walker for the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency et al.
|
| [73] |
Daniel J. Popeo and Paul D. Kamenar filed a brief for the Washington
Legal Foundation as amicus curiae.
|
| |
|
| |
Opinion Footnotes
|
| |
|
| [74] |
*fn1 There was evidence that immediately after
the shooting Eddings said: "I would rather
have shot an Officer than go back to where I live." App. 93.
|
| [75] |
*fn2 The psychiatrist suggested that, at the
time of the murder, Eddings was in his own mind
shooting his stepfather -- a policeman who had been married to his mother
for a brief period when Eddings was seven. The
psychiatrist stated: "I think that given the circumstances and the facts
of his life, and the facts of his arrested development, he acted as a
seven year old seeking revenge and rebellion; and the act -- he did pull
the trigger, he did kill someone, but I don't even think he knew that he
was doing it." Id., at 172.
|
| [76] |
*fn3 The trial judge found first that the crime
was "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" because "designed to inflict a high
degree of pain . . . in utter indifference to the rights of Patrolman
Crabtree." Id., at 187. Second, the judge found that the crime was
"committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or
prosecution." Id., at 187-188. The evidence was sufficient to indicate
that at the time of the offense Eddings did not wish to be
returned to Missouri and that in stopping the car the officer's intent was
to make a lawful arrest. Finally, the trial judge found that Eddings
posed a continuing threat of violence to society. There was evidence that
at one point on the day of the murder, after Eddings had been taken to the
county jail, he told two officers that "if he was loose . . . he would
shoot" them all. Id., at 77. There was also evidence that at another time,
when an officer refused to turn off the light in Eddings' cell, Eddings
became angry and threatened the officer: "Now I have shot one of you
people, and I'll get you too if you don't turn this light out." Id., at
103. Based on these two "spontaneous utterances," id., at 188, the trial
judge found a strong likelihood that Eddings would again commit a
criminal act of violence if released.
|
| [77] |
*fn4 We understand the Court of Criminal Appeals
to hold that the murder of a police officer in the performance of his
duties is "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" under the Oklahoma statute. See
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 (1977).
However, we doubt that the trial judge's understanding and application of
this aggravating circumstance conformed to that degree of certainty
required by our decision in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). See n. 3, supra.
|
| [78] |
*fn5 Because we decide this case on the basis of
Lockett v. Ohio, we do not reach the question of whether -- in light of
contemporary standards -- the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a
defendant who was 16 at the time of the offense. Cf. Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
|
| [79] |
*fn6 "[The] jury's attention is focused on the
characteristics of the person who committed the crime: . . . Are there any
special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital
punishment (e. g., his youth, the extent of his cooperation with the
police, his emotional state at the time of the crime)." 428
U.S., at 197.
|
| [80] |
*fn7 "A process that accords no significance to
relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or
the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in
fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate
or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It
treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely
individual human beings . . . ." 428 U.S., at
304.
|
| [81] |
*fn8 Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference
that can be drawn is that the court did not consider petitioner's juvenile
record and family life to be a mitigating circumstance"); Tr. of Oral Arg.
36 ("the trial court did not consider the fact of his family background as
a mitigating circumstance. . . . [The] violent background, which I assume
he meant was . . . [that Eddings] was subject to some
slapping around and some beating by his father") (argument of
respondent).
|
| [82] |
*fn9 Eddings argued to the Court of
Criminal Appeals that imposition of the death penalty in the particular
circumstances of his case, and in light of the mitigating factors present,
was excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment. But he did not
specifically argue that the trial judge erred in refusing to consider
relevant mitigating circumstances in the process of sentencing. In
rejecting his claim of excessive punishment, the court examined the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and held that Eddings'
family history and emotional disorder were not mitigating circumstances
that ought to be weighed in the balance. The court's holding that these
factors were irrelevant to an inquiry into excessiveness was also a
holding that they need not have been considered by the sentencer in
imposing capital punishment. Similarly, Eddings' argument in his petition
for certiorari that imposition of the death penalty was excessive on the
facts of this case comprises the argument that the sentencer erred in
refusing to consider relevant mitigating circumstances proffered by him at
the sentencing hearing. In short, although neither the opinion of the
Court of Criminal Appeals nor Eddings' petition for certiorari
spoke to our decision in Lockett by name, the question of whether the
decisions below were consistent with our decision in Lockett is properly
before us. Our jurisdiction does not depend on citation to book and verse.
See, e. g., New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 67 (1928).
Although Eddings' petition for certiorari
did not expressly present the Lockett issue, his brief in this Court
argued it, and the State responded to the argument. Brief for Petitioner
64-67; Brief for Respondent 55-57. The dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, post, at 120, n. 1, states that the courts below were not
afforded the opportunity to consider this issue. The fact is, however,
that in his petition to the Court of Criminal Appeals for a rehearing, Eddings
specifically presented the issue and at some considerable length. See
Petition for Re-Hearing and Supporting Brief in No. C-78-325, p. 10 ("This
Court, by its interpretation of mitigating circumstances, has effectively
limited the scope of mitigation and that limitation renders the Oklahoma
death penalty statute unconstitutional"). The Court of Criminal Appeals
denied the petition, stating that it had given it full consideration and
had been "fully advised in the premises." See Rule 1.18, Rules of the
Court of Criminal Appeals (1980) (court will entertain new arguments upon
a petition for rehearing). Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 476 (1975). See also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 265, n. 5 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 631, n. 6 (1980); Vachon v. New
Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, 479, n. 3
(1974).
|
| [83] |
*fn10 We note that the Oklahoma death penalty
statute permits the defendant to present evidence "as to any mitigating
circumstances." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.10 (1980). Lockett requires
the sentencer to listen.
|
| [84] |
*fn11 "Adolescents everywhere, from every walk
of life, are often dangerous to themselves and to others." The President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force
Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 41 (1967). "[Adolescents,]
particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable, more
impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by
youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older
persons, but they deserve less punishment because adolescents may have
less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms
than adults. Moreover, youth crime as such is not exclusively the
offender's fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of
family, school, and the social system, which share responsibility for the
development of America's youth." Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on
Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 7
(1978).
|
| [85] |
*fn12 As Justice Frankfurter stated,
"[children] have a very special place in life which law should reflect."
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring
opinion). And indeed the law does reflect this special place. Every State
in the country makes some separate provision for juvenile offenders. See
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967).
|
| [86] |
*fn13 See, e. g., National Advisory Committee
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force Report on Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention 3 (1976).
|
| |
|
| |
Concurrence Footnotes
|
| |
|
| [87] |
*fn* Despite THE CHIEF JUSTICE's argument that
we may not consider the Lockett issue because it was never fairly
presented to the court below, there is precedent for this Court to
consider the merits of the issue. In Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S.
261, 265, n. 5 (1981), this Court wrote:
"Even if one considers that the conflict-of-interest question was not
technically raised below, there is ample support for a remand required in
the interests of justice. See 28 U. S. C. § 2106 (authorizing this Court
to 'require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the
circumstances')." Because the trial court's failure to consider all of the
mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death sentence, in
plain violation of Lockett, it is our duty to remand this case for
resentencing.
|
| |
|
| |
Dissent Footnotes
|
| |
|
| [88] |
*fn1 The Court struggles to demonstrate that
"the question of whether the decisions below were consistent with our
decision in Lockett is properly before us." Ante, at 113-114, n. 9. It
argues that petitioner's "Lockett claim" was somehow inherent in his
general assertion that the death penalty was "excessive." However, it is
obvious that petitioner not only failed to present to this Court the
question which the Court now addresses, but also never "fairly presented"
the Lockett argument to the state courts so as to have afforded them the
first "opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts
bearing upon [his] constitutional claim." Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275-277 (1971). Indeed, petitioner concedes as much,
admitting that the "Lockett error was not enumerated or argued on appeal
to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals . . . ." Brief for Petitioner
64.
|
| [89] |
*fn2 In that case the evidence showed that
while Lockett waited in a "getaway" car, her three companions robbed a
store; during the robbery, the proprietor was fatally wounded. Lockett was
charged with aggravated murder with two "specifications" of "aggravating
circumstances": (1) that the murder was "committed for the purpose of
escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment" for aggravated
robbery; and (2) that the murder was "committed while . . . committing,
attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or
attempting to commit . . . aggravated robbery." See Ohio Rev. Code §
2929.04(A) (1975).
|
| [90] |
*fn3 It is ironic that in his petition for
certiorari filed with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, petitioner
asserted that the Oklahoma sentencing scheme was constitutionally
deficient, because "[the] mitigating circumstances which may be considered
are not statutorily defined or limited" (emphasis added).
|
| [91] |
*fn4 Although I think it is immaterial to a
correct decision of this case, it is worth noting that the Court
overstates and oversimplifies the evidence presented by Eddings at
the sentencing hearing. For example, it twice characterizes the testimony
as indicating that, at the time of the crime, Eddings' "mental and emotional
development were at a level several years below his age." Ante, at 107,
116. Dr. Dietsche, a psychologist, testified that if forced to extrapolate
from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale he would place petitioner's
"mental age" at about 14 years, 6 months; however, he then said that this
mental age would have "no meaning" since "the mental age concepts break
down . . . between fourteen to sixteen years of age." He went on to state:
"My opinion is that [Eddings] has the intelligence of
an adult." App. 134-136 (emphasis added). Describing a single interview
with petitioner while he was awaiting trial on murder charges, Dr. Rettig,
a sociologist, said that petitioner's "responses appeared to me to be
several years below his chronological age"; he "[qualified]" this answer,
however, by noting that petitioner was "under a great deal of constraint
in the atmosphere in which I saw him." Id., at 149. Finally, Dr. Gagliano,
a psychiatrist, opined on the basis of a one-hour interview -- during
which petitioner's attorney was present and refused to allow questioning
about petitioner's "mental status" on the day of the shooting, id., at 177
-- that at the time petitioner pulled the trigger, "he acted as a seven
year old seeking revenge and rebellion" against his stepfather, a
policeman. Id., at 172-173. Dr. Gagliano was also willing to state
categorically, on the basis of this single interview, and without
reference to the results of the psychological testing of Eddings,
id., at 174, that Eddings was "preordained" to
commit the murder from the time his parents were divorced, when he was
five. Id., at 179-180. This sort of "determinist" approach is rejected by
an overwhelming majority of psychiatrists.
|
| [92] |
*fn5 It is not even clear what the trial court
meant by Eddings' "violent background."
For example, Eddings' probation officer
testified that Eddings had "problems with
fighting" while in school, and had once been charged with "Assault with
intent to do great bodily harm." Id., at 106-107. The State seems to
concede, however, that the court was probably referring, at least in part,
to Eddings' family history. See
Brief for Respondent 55 ("the inference that can be drawn is that the
court did not consider petitioner's juvenile record and family life to be
a mitigating circumstance") (emphasis added). But cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35
("the remark is ambiguous. It could be interpreted to mean that [the trial
court] was not going to consider the juvenile's previous juvenile record
in Missouri, which was extensive . . .").
|
| [93] |
*fn6 On the other hand, the Court's opinion
concedes that petitioner's youth was given serious consideration as a
"mitigating circumstance," although his age at the time of the offense
would not "tend to support a legal excuse from criminal
responsibility."
|
| [94] |
*fn7 When Eddings' companions informed him
that the officer's patrol car was approaching, Eddings responded that if the
"mother . . . pig tried to stop him he was going to blow him away." App.
66.
|
| [95] |
*fn8 Nor is this choice necessarily an
unreasonable one. As the Court notes, "[evidence] of a difficult family
history and of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants
in mitigation." Ante, at 115. One might even be surprised if a person
capable of a brutal and unprovoked killing of a police officer did not
suffer from some sort of "personality disorder."
Indeed, Dr. Dietsche, who testified that Eddings had a "sociopathic or
antisocial personality," see ante, at 107, estimated that 91% "of your
criminal element" would test as sociopathic or antisocial. App. 136. Dr.
Dietsche defined "antisocial personalities" as individuals without "the
usual type of companions" or "loyalties," who are "[frequently] . . .
selfish, . . . very impulsive," showing "little in the line of
responsibility" or concern "for the needs or wants of others," and
"[having] little in the line of guilt or remorse." Id., at 137-138.
Although the Court describes Dietsche's testimony as indicating that
"approximately 30% of youths suffering from such a disorder grew out of it
as they aged," ante, at 107, Dietsche was in fact describing a study which
he thought had subsequently been discredited. App. 139-141. Even that
study, however, concluded that most of those who "grew out of" the
disorder by the age of 35 or 40 were "more of a con-artist type" and "not
. . . the assaultive type." Ibid. A more recent study estimated that only
20% of sociopathic persons were "treatable," id., at 141; in this study,
only 9 of 255 initial participants were successfully treated, after
"literally . . . thousands of hours of therapy." Id., at 142. Thus,
characterization of Eddings as a "sociopath" may
connote little more than that he is egocentric, concerned only with his
own desires and unremorseful, has a propensity for criminal conduct, and
is unlikely to respond well to conventional psychiatric treatment --
hardly significant "mitigating" factors. See Blocker v. United States, 110
U. S. App. D.C. 41, 48-49, and nn. 11, 12, 288 F.2d 853, 860-861, and nn. 11, 12 (1961) (Burger, J., concurring in
result). While the Court speaks of Eddings' "severe emotional
disturbance," ante, at 115; see also ante, at 116, it appears to be
referring primarily to the testimony that Eddings was a sociopath, and to
Dr. Gagliano's rather fantastic speculation concerning Eddings'
dissociation at the time of the crime, see n. 4, supra. The Court's
opinion exemplifies the proposition that the very occurrence of the crime
functions as a powerful impetus to search for a theory to explain it. See
Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 183,
190-191
(1958).
|